Ruetsche on the pristine and adulterated in quantum field theory by Halvorson, Hans
Ruetsche on the pristine and adulterated in quantum
eld theory∗
Hans Halvorson
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University
August 31, 2012
It might seem that philosophy of science has fallen on hard times. When not being pilloried
by famous scientists, philosophy of science receives scant attention from the educated public.is
is not to say that work in philosophy of science is not ourishing; but surely what is ourishing
most — in terms of number of jobs, number of publications, etc. — is the philosophy of the specic
sciences, such as physics, biology, etc.. So does “general philosophy of science” have a future? Will
that subject cease to exist, to be completely replaced by philosophical investigation of the specic
sciences?
Judging by its title, Laura Ruetsche’s book Interpreting Quantum eories would seem to con-
rm the trend towards fragmentation in philosophy of science. And indeed, the book does discuss
quantum theory in great detail and depth; it would certainly make for dicult reading for some-
body with no college-level training in physics. But if you thought that Ruetsche’s book adds another
nail to the con of general philosophy of science, then you thought wrong. Ruetsche’s book is set
apart from many of the recent books of the philosophy of physics, not only in its engagement with
the quantum theory of innite systems (including quantum eld theory), but also in its explicit en-
gagement with questions from general philosophy of science. In fact, while Ruetsche does much to
advance our understanding of the quantum theory of innite systems, her challenge to the “received
view” of what it means to interpret a scientic theory will be of interest to anyone working in any
sub-eld of philosophy of science.
e claim that general philosophy of science has something to say for foundational work in the
particular sciences was defended by Larry Sklar in his bookeory and Truth. Similarly, philoso-
phers such as Arthur Fine and Bas van Fraassen have argued that work on the foundations of physics
bears directly on the big questions in general philosophy of science (e.g. realism vs. antirealism).
Ruetsche’s book continues in the tradition of Sklar, Fine, and van Fraassen, but with perhaps the
most sophisticated engagement with mathematical physics that we have ever seen in a “philosophi-
cal”monograph. Tomyknowledge, nomonographhas ever contained both the phrases “nomiracles
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argument” and “Connes’ classication of type III factors,” much less shown how they are related to
each other.
So, Ruetsche’s book operates on two levels. On the rst level, Ruetsche discusses foundational
issues in the quantum theory of innite systems. On the second level, Ruetsche puts forward an ar-
gument about what philosophers of science should be doing. Beautifully, these two levels are inter-
twined throughout the book. However, for the purposes of this review, it will be helpful to separate
the strands. First, I will sketch Ruetsche’s argument against what she calls “extremist” interpreta-
tions of QM∞. Second, I will discuss Ruetsche’s argument that sans an extremist interpretation,
QM∞ demands a revision of scientic realism.
According to Ruetsche, philosophy of science must constantly reevaluate itself and its maxims
in the light of the complexities of real-life scientic theories. Her case in point is the quantum
theory of innite systems (QM∞), a theory of notorious mathematical and conceptual diculty.
Ruetsche’s main claim is that the traditional conception of how to interpret a theory cannot make
sense of the complexities of QM∞. Although her argument for this claim occupies the entire book,
we are provided along the way with a pedagogical introduction to QM∞, as well as with many sub-
arguments of independent interest.
As Ruetsche points out, the standing conception of how to interpret a theory is based on a
metaphor frommathematical logic: one gives meaning to a formal theory — or “interprets” it — by
assigningmeanings to the symbols so that all the sentences of the theory come out as true. Similarly,
the standing conception would have us take a physical theory as a partially interpreted formal cal-
culus, which we can then endow with meaning by describing how the world might be such that the
theory is true. Notice that in both cases, there is a clear distinction between two phases: in the rst
phase, the theory is constructed qua formal system; in the second phase, the theory is interpreted
or “endowed with content.”
is standard conception of interpretation lies behind the copious literature on the interpreta-
tion of elementary quantummechanics. It is typical in this literature rst to describe the “statistical
algorithm” of quantum mechanics — i.e. a recipe for computing the probabilities of measurement
outcomes. Only aer a formalism for computing such probabilities has been constructed does the
question arise, “what does this theory say?” Giving an answer to that question is the task of inter-
preting quantum mechanics.
Obviously, we philosophers have had some trouble in agreeing on an interpretation of quantum
mechanics. But at least we seem to agree on what needs to be done, i.e. we agree on what formalism
needs to be interpreted: the states are vectors in a Hilbert space (or, more generally, density opera-
tors), and the quantities are Hermitian linear operators on that Hilbert space. But when we come to
QM∞, everything goes haywire. For the typical case in QM∞ it’s not even clear what the right sets
of states and quantities are! So, it seems like philosophers cannot even get started on QM∞, because
the mathematical physicists haven’t told us yet what formalism we should interpret.
At this point, Ruetsche reminds us of something that we shouldn’t need to be reminded about:
philosophy (of science) should be continuous with science. In particular, there is no strict division
between the task of constructing a formal system to accommodate the phenomena, and the task
of interpreting that formalism. In particular, philosophers can and should be involved even in the
rst stage of formalizing or regimenting QM∞, because doing so is not dierent in principle from
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interpreting the theory.
To reiterate, QM∞ is not completely clear about what formal apparatus should be taken to repre-
sent reality. For example, suppose that we want to describe the “free Boson quantum eld.” As usual
for quantum theory, we need a Hilbert space whose vectors represent the states of the eld. Where
do we nd this Hilbert space? One possibility is to take the space of solutions to the classical Klein-
Gordon equation, and then dene a notion of multiplication by complex numbers (which we need,
because the state spaces of quantum systems are complex vector spaces). Unfortunately, there are at
least two distinct natural ways to dene multiplication by complex numbers, giving us two distinct
possibilities for the Hilbert space of the free Boson eld. Well, maybe these two Hilbert spaces are
just notational variants of each other? Unfortunately, no: it can be proven that these two choices
of Hilbert space give “inequivalent representations” of the canonical commutation relations, and as
Ruetsche argues at length (in §2.2), these inequivalent representations give physically inequivalent
theories.
Here we encounter a minor crisis in the foundations of quantum eld theory, a crisis which has
motivated a large proportion of the philosophical literature on QFT in the past two decades — by
Ruetsche herself, as well as by Rob Clion, John Earman, Fred Kronz, and Tracy Lupher, among
others. And let’s not forget that QFT is our fundamental theory of the constitution of matter! If we
can’t even say clearly what this theory is, then how are we supposed to interpret it, and how are we
supposed to derive metaphysical morals from it?
It is clear that this crisis in QFT was an initial motivation for Ruetsche’s book. But Ruetsche’s
solution to the crisis is a “meta-level” solution: instead of oering yet one more proposal within the
ambit of the standard approach to interpreting physical theories, Ruetsche argues that no interpre-
tation within this framework will work, and that we need to change the rules of the game.
As you might expect, there are two sorts of responses — within the ambit of the standard ap-
proach to interpreting physical theories — to the minor crisis: one sort of response tries to nd
reasons for privileging one particular choice of state space, and the other sort of response tries to
show that the dierent choices of state space are, in some sense, equivalent. (It’s interesting how
these two sorts of responses coincide with traditional realist and anti-realist strategies: the realist
inates our epistemic abilities in order to keep up with ontology; the anti-realist deates ontology
so that our epistemic abilities keep up with it.) Ruetsche thenmakes two long, sustained arguments:
rst she argues that neither of these “extremist” responses can allow QM∞ to do what it has been
claimed to do. Second, Ruetsche argues that the standard conception of how to interpret a theory
would require adoption of one of these “extremist” responses, and she concludes that the traditional
conception must be abandoned. Let’s look at these two arguments in turn.
e two extremist interpretations ofQM∞ are described inChapter 6 and given the titles “Hilbert
space conservatism” and “algebraic imperialism.” As a reminder, conservatism is the view thatwhen-
ever we’re using QM∞ to describe something, then we should be using one particular Hilbert space.
Imperialism claims that we don’t need to choose between the competing Hilbert space descriptions,
because they are “descriptive u” (to borrow a phrase from John Earman). e consignment of
the Hilbert space to the realm of u is motivated by a mathematical result derived by Irving Segal.
Segal’s result shows that all of these competing Hilbert space descriptions have a piece of structure
in common; in fact, Segal invented a new branch of mathematics in order to describe this piece of
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shared structure: the theory of C∗-algebras.
Let’s be a bit more clear about Segal’s idea.e theory of the free Boson eld — the most simple
quantum eld theory— requires operators ϕ(x) and ψ(x), one for each point x of space; moreover,
these operators are required to obey the canonical commutation relations:
ϕ(x)ψ(x) − ψ(x)ϕ(x) = iħI.
As mentioned above, there is more than one Hilbert space that carries operators satisfying these
relations, and these Hilbert spaces yield physically inequivalent quantum theories. But Segal’s idea
is to restrict attention to a smaller set of quantities: those that can be constructed from the eld
operators ϕ(x),ψ(x) by standard algebraic operations (sums, products, scalar multiples), and by
taking limits relative to a very ne topology (one in which few sequences converge). If we use A to
represent the algebra obtained by implementing this process on the rst Hilbert space H, and A′ to
represent the algebra obtained by implementing the process on the second Hilbert space H′, then
Segal shows that there is an isomorphism f ∶ A → A′. For Segal, the isomorphism f provides the
mathematical justication for saying, on the one hand, that it doesn’t matter which Hilbert space H
or H′ we use, and on the other hand, that the operators in the algebra A (equivalently A′) represent
all the “real” physical quantities.
Ruetsche, following Aristides Arageorgis, calls the Segal-style proposal “algebraic imperialism,”
but it might more appropriately be called “algebraic Ockhamism,” or “algebraic structuralism,” or
something like that. In any case, algebraic imperialism tries to avoid an underdetermination prob-
lem by reducing the number of facts about which one needs to make a commitment.
e problem with Hilbert space conservatism is obvious: the conservative owes us a reason
for privileging one particular Hilbert space over the others. Ruetsche calls this the “problem of
privilege,” and discusses it extensively in §6.2. She supplies further arguments against conservatism
in Chapters 9 and 10, where she deals with cases where two dierent Hilbert spaces, say H and
H′, come equipped with two dierent particle notions. She argues that no particle notion can be
fundamental in QFT, and consequently that general metaphysical considerations cannot solve the
problem of privilege.
But what’s the problem with algebraic imperialism? In short, the problem with algebraic impe-
rialism is the problem that commonly plagues the Ockhamists: in trying to minimize the number
of posits needed to explain a phenomenon, there is always a danger that one does violence to the
explanandum. In this case, Ruetsche carries a heavy burden of proof: she needs to convince us that
there are phenomena that cannot be explained by the algebraic imperialist.
Ruetsche’s argument against imperialism occupies Chapters 12–14, and makes use of two appli-
cations of QM∞: rst, Ruetsche argues that quantum statistical mechanics’ explanation of phase
coexistence cannot be reproduced by the imperialist. Second, Ruetsche argues that quantum eld
theory’s explanation of spontaneous symmetry breaking cannot be reproduced by the imperialist.
I will look here only at the rst argument, since it is the technically simpler of the two. (Ruetsche
herself places more stock in the second argument, since it doesn’t involve any controversial ideal-
izations.)
Quantum statistical mechanics (QSM) purports to be able to explain why materials undergo
phase changes at certain critical temperatures. Ruetsche considers one particular andwell-understood
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case of this phenomenon, namely the spontaneous polarization of a ferromagnet. Here the task is
to make sense of the idea that the ferromagnet has more than one ground state, a fact which cannot
be accommodated in elementary quantum mechanics.
To cut straight to the punchline, distinct ground states of the ferromagnet live in dierent (in-
equivalent) Hilbert spaces. So, you might think that imperialism actually has the explanatory ad-
vantage, since it doesn’t privilege one of the Hilbert spaces. Indeed, more is true: the imperalist
deems as physically possible any state of the abstract algebra A of observables, and every vector in
every Hilbert space gives rise to such a state! So, the imperialist very explicitly endorses the physical
possibility of these distinct ground states of the ferromagnet. So where, according to Ruetsche, does
the problem arise?e problem, in short, is that the imperalist doesn’t recognize enough quantities.
What do we mean when we say that there are “distinct ground states?” Surely we mean that
there are two ground states and they dier in some way. But in the physical world, two states dier
only if some quantity has a dierent value. So, if there are two ground states, then there should be
some quantity Q that has a dierent value in the two states. Indeed, this is (intuitively) the case for
the ferromagnet: the dierent ground states disagree on the value of the global polarization of the
magnet.
But here, according to Ruetsche, is the rub for the imperialist: the global polarization quantity
is not in the abstract algebra A, and so is not recognized as a physical quantity. So, perhaps the
imperialist cannot, aer all, explain the existence of distinct ground states, because he cannot say
how such states dier from each other.
If Ruetsche’s argument were as simple as this, then the imperialist would have a simple reply:
although the imperialist denies that there is a quantity called “global polarization,” there are other
quantities in the abstract algebra A on which the distinct ground states will disagree. So, there is
certainly no problem— in the abstract — with distinguishing between these ground states. Indeed,
more is true: there is a sequence (ai) of operators in A that converge (in an appropriate topology on
A) to the operator representing the global polarization, and the dierent ground states must assign
dierent values to elements in any tail of this sequence.
But Ruetsche’s argument is more nuanced. First of all, I was being sloppy when I said that the
sequence (ai) in A converges to the global polarization operator. In fact, A is not complete in the
relevant topology, and (ai) is a Cauchy sequence with no limit point in A. So, the global polarization
operator does not live inside A, but in a completion A= of A relative to a specic topology. So, does
the imperialist really mean that all operators in A= represent physical quantities? No, he cannot
mean this, because A= is not shared across all of the possible Hilbert spaces H,H′,H′′, . . . . In other
words, taking A= as the set of physical quantities is tantamount to choosing one particular Hilbert
space H, a choice that the imperialist has already foresworn.
Furthermore, there are states of the abstract algebra A relative to which the expectation values of
the sequence (ai) of operators do not form a convergent sequence of real numbers.us, the impe-
rialist cannot treat the sequence (ai) as a surrogate for the global polarization observable, because
this sequence does not give well-dened expectation values in every state.
What is the imperialist to do? At this point, I can tell you what they actually do, where “they”
denotes the mathematical physicists who work with QM∞: they declare that only a proper subset
of the states on A are physically possible. Without going into details, an appropriate choice of the
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subset of physically possible states brings the quantities and states back into harmony: there are
enough states to describe all situations we encounter, and there are enough quantities to distinguish
the features of these states.
So why not just make this small addendum to imperialism: not all states on A are physically
possible, but only a subset thereof, which must be chosen based on specic features of the sys-
tem under investigation. I’ll lay my cards on the table and say that this addendum is probably the
right way to go. But the addendum has a problem: it does not lead to a “pristine interpretation” in
Ruetsche’s terminology. According to Ruetsche, an interpretation of a physical theory is pristine if
in identifying the physically possible words, it invokes only, “general principles of metaphysics and
epistemology” (p. 4). But this addendum to imperialism requires one to invoke contingent factors
in order to whittle down the state space; as such, this addendum “adulterates” imperialism.
One might think that adulteration is a bad thing, and indeed it has been treated as such —
according to Ruetsche — in most work on the interpretation of quantum theory. But Ruetsche’s
argument is intended to show that one must adulterate in order to give an adequate interpretation
to QM∞.
Back to the big picture, what does all this have to dowith general philosophy of science? Accord-
ing to Ruetsche, the ideal of pristine interpretation ismotivated by scientic realism, and specically
by the sort of scientic realism that rests on the “no miracles” argument. Recall that the no miracles
argument says that the success of a scientic theory T would be amiracle if T weren’t at least approx-
imately true. Ruetsche claims, however, that while the no miracles argument might look plausible
in the abstract (with T a free variable), it can start to look shy when T is replaced with a specic
scientic theory. For example, let T be elementary quantum mechanics, which is obviously suc-
cessful, at least at making predictions. But does that success give us reason to think that quantum
mechanics is (approximately) true? e problem here is that quantum mechanics is only partially
interpreted, and so we would have to endow it with content — i.e. interpret it — before we could
believe or disbelieve it.
In the case of elementary QM, there are pristine interpretations, e.g. the Everrett interpretation,
Bohmian mechanics. So, one might think that the success of QM gives us reason to believe one
of these interpretations. Now, QM∞ is even more empirically successful than elementary QM, so
shouldn’t we also believe QM∞? But if we were convinced by Ruetsche’s arguments, then there is
no pristine interpretation of QM∞ that underwrites its empirical success; there are only various
adulterated interpretations that work for specic applications and contexts.
What is the upshot for general philosophy of science? Some might think that the upshot is a
strong argument against scientic realism. But Ruetsche doesn’t ever suggest abandoning realism;
rather, she suggests that realism must adapt itself to the complexity of current scientic theory. At
this stage, it starts to become unclear to me what Ruetsche is proposing as a modied scientic
realism. One possibility is that she is proposing a sort of contextualized realism, according to which
we should believe our individual theories, but should not attempt to supply a single interpretation
— or metaphysical account — that encompasses all these theories. Such a contextualized realism
is probably the most phenomenologically adequate account of current science, since the size of the
research community hasmade it practically impossible to unify all the diverse strands of knowledge.
But, in my opinion, contextualized realism is more of a stop-gap than an ideal for which we should
6
aspire.
In selecting out a few threads from Ruetsche’s book, I have not come even close to doing jus-
tice to its rich contents. Beyond the points I have covered, there are entire chapters devoted to the
modal interpretation applied to QM∞, to spontaneous symmetry breaking, and to phenomenologi-
cal particle notions. Each of these chapters by itself makes an important contribution to philosophy
of physics; but amazingly, Ruetsche ties them each to the overarching argument against pristine
interpretations, and for a modication of traditional scientic realism.
I hope to have given you some sense of the sophistication of Ruetsche’s book. It is a book that
repays close study, and which should be discussed extensively by philosophers in the years to come.
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